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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DERON BRUNSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Vs. 
ETITLE INSURANCE AGENCY, 
TRUSTEE, & JANE AND JOHN DOE 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendant and Appellees. 
Appellate 3 Case No. 200908969 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
And 
Demand for Transparency 
DEMAND FOR TRANSPARENCY 
A decision rendered by the appellate court judge(s) on this appeal without 
specifically addressing the issues raised in this brief will have violated the object 
principle of justice thus corrupting the justice system while mocking due process. 
Addressing the issues raised by Appellant gives transparency which proves that his brief 
was properly viewed and adjudicated thus protecting Appellant's right of due process. 
Appellant hereby demands from the Utah Court of Appeals a transparent decision 
demonstrating the issues raised in this appeal were addressed thus protecting Appellant's 
rights of due process—the right to be heard. 
If it is discovered by Appellant that a law clerk or a judge's assistant, or other type 
of individual who is not a judge assigned to this case who becomes responsible for a 
1 
decision rendered heretofore, such state actors whom are not immune from the cross hairs 
of litigation may be held personally liable for violating Appellants due process rights. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final order of the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for 
Utah County, State of Utah of the Honorable Fred D. Howard presiding. This appeal is 
authorized by Utah Code Ann. §78A-5-102(l) & (6) and §78A-4-103(l) & (2), as this is 
an appeal from a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trail court erred by not following controlling case law that set 
the standard for a motion to dismiss. 
A motion to dismiss is reviewed under a correctness standard, Debry v. Valley 
Mortgt. Co., 835 p.2d 1000 (Utah app. 1992) 
The standard for a motion to dismiss was raised at the trial court. (See the 
transcript of the hearing dated August 24' 2009 Page 14 ffif 15-24, and page 20, ff3-l 1.) 
In addition, when the judge admitted that he read the pleadings [Id., at transcript page 2 
f21] this preserves Plaintiffs brief in it's entirety at the trial court. 
2. Whether the trial court erred by not adhering to rule 8 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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A motion to dismiss is reviewed under a correctness standard, Debry v. Valley 
Mortgt. Co., 835 p.2d 1000 (Utah app. 1992) 
The record shows that Appellant's Verified Amended Complaint was never 
challenged against the standard of rule 8 beyond Appellee's threadbare recital of rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor was this type of challenged preserved 
at the trial court. 
3. Whether the trial court erred by trying the merits of the case on a motion to 
dismiss. 
A motion to dismiss is reviewed under a correctness standard, Debry v. Valley 
Mortgt. Co., 835 p.2d 1000 (Utah app. 1992) 
At the trial court it was preserved that a motion to dismiss it is not an opportunity 
for the trial court to decide the merits of the case. [Id, at transcript page 14 f^ |8 & 15-23] 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: "A pleading which sets forth a 
claim for relief.. . shall contain (1) a short a plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he 
deems himself entitled." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about April 13, 2009 Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee alleging 
three causes of actions. The first cause of action is for wrongful foreclosure, the second 
cause of action is for injunction, and the third cause of action is for punitive damages. 
On or about the 4th day of May, 2009 Appellee filed a motion to dismiss with 
points and authorities pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On or about May 6, 2009 Appellant filed a verified memorandum in opposition to 
Appellee's motion to dismiss. A hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on August 
24, 2009 whereupon the trial court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss. An order 
reflecting that decision was prepared by Appellant and singed by the trail court on 
September 21, 2009. This timely appeal was filed on October 21, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant alleges in his Verified Amended Complaint ("Complaint") the first 
cause of action for wrongful foreclosure and alleges that: (1) on or about March 30, 2007 
he signed closing documents to secure a loan to purchase a building lot located in Draper, 
UT. ("Property"), and that (2) while he was at closing to sign all the closing documents 
for the said loan, Appellant mentioned to the agent at closing that he was not able to 
understand the various closing documents who then responded to Appellant that nobody 
reads them, and that most people just sign away, and that (3) on or about October 17, 
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2008 Appellant decided it was important to understand the said closing documents. 
During this time of studying Appellant realized he did not have a copy of the promissory 
note ("Note") and how this note is of great importance to an instrument called the Deed 
of Trust ("Deed") which is a very important document that is part of the closing 
documents used to obtain the said loan, and that (4) the Deed is void without the Note 
because the note determines how much money the borrower owes the lender with 
interest, what the periodic payments are to be, and how the Deed secures the debt 
evidenced by the Note. [See Complaint ^8-17] 
Appellant also alleges in his Complaint that (1) on February 6, 2009 Appellant 
sent a certified letter [attached to the Complaint as exhibit B] to IndyMac Federal Bank, 
("IndyMac") requesting a copy of the said promissory note which IndyMac never 
provided, and that (2) because IndyMac did not send a copy of this very important 
instrument it can only mean that Appellant never executed the Note, therefore Appellant 
claims he did not execute the Note and that there exist no evidence that Appellant ever 
signed or agreed to the Note. [See Complaint ^|8-17] 
Appellant also alleges in his Complaint that (1) Appellee's filed a notice of default 
against Appellants property, and that (2) this notice of default stems from a Deed that is 
secured by the Note, and that (3) because Appellant never agreed to the promissory note, 
the said Deed is invalid and unenforceable, and that (4) Appellee's filed a wrongful 
Notice of Default based upon the Note that does not exist and a Deed that is void or 
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unenforceable, and therefore Appellee's have no right to proceed with a non-judicial 
foreclosure to take Appellant's property, and that (5) the claims that are set forth in the 
Note are in default which is a false claim because Appellant never signed or agreed to the 
Note. [See Complaint ffi[8-17] 
Appellant also alleges damages for the first cause of action stating: (1) that 
Appellee's foreclosure action is propounding damages against Appellant for the amount 
of the Property of $351,224.38 with interest daily accruing due to IndyMac, and that (2) 
Appellee is damaging Appellant in actual damages of $76,374.34 which is the amount 
Appellant paid on the property including closing cost, all together Appellant is alleging 
damages totaling $427,598.72. [See Complaint ffi[18-20] 
Also Appellant alleges, for the second cause of action for Injunction, that: (1) 
Appellant has no remedy at law or otherwise for the damage done and threatened to be 
done by Appellee's sale, once completed, cannot be reversed as to a third party buyer 
who is acting in good faith and has paid valuable consideration, and that (2) Appellee's 
are wrongfully seeking a prejudgment seizure and attachment through a wrongful non-
judicial foreclosure on Appellant's Property, and that this constitutes a violation of due 
process provisions of the Utah Constitution which constitutes damage of irreparable 
injury. [See Complaint at ff22-26] 
Appellant alleges for damages that a preliminary injunction stopping Appellee's 
from foreclosure proceedings would satisfy this cause of action. 
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In Appellants Complaint he alleges for the third cause of action for punitive 
damages that: (1) Appellee is in the business of foreclosing with constructive knowledge 
of laws governing foreclosure with years of experience, and that (2) failing to check to 
see if the Deed is valid constitutes a gross neglect of duty, and that (3) because Appellee 
did not validate the Deed and Note, Appellant is seeking punitive damages in the amount 
of $1,000,000.00. [See Complaint at 1fi{27-28] 
Appellee's motion to dismiss, and arguments at hearing, argued the merits of the 
case and did not argue more then the threadbare recital of rule 12(b)(6) in claiming that 
Appellant did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Appellee does not 
demonstrate or claim how the facts (which are admitted as being true) in Appellants 
Complaint could not sustain his causes of actions, nor does Appellee allege by any 
factual conclusion that Appellant's Complaint does not satisfy Rule 8 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. In addition, Appellee withdrew its motion to dismiss which was 
ignored by the trial court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On Appellee's motion to dismiss, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly 
became the law when it tried the merits of the case and did not properly determine the 
sufficiency of Appellant's Complaint—the trial court committed reversible error when it 
became the law and stepped outside of the boundaries of controlling law by granting 
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Appellee's motion to dismiss. In the instant that the trial court became the law it violated 
the object principle of justice which cannot be violated. 
The trial court erred when it (a) ignored Appellee's withdrawal of its motion to 
dismiss, and (b) when it unjustifiably stepped outside of controlling law invoked by 
Appellant in order to grant Appellee's motion to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
L The trial court erred when it did not recognize by law that Appellee had 
withdrawn its motion to dismiss 
The standard for obtaining a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is a high one. "A 
rule 12b(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the 
plaintiffs right to relief based upon those facts." St Benedict's Development co. v. St 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, F96 (Utah 1991) (citing 61 A Am.Jur.2d Pleading § 227 
(1981)). "A motion to dismiss will be affirmed only where it appears to a certainty that 
the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of its claims." Heiner v. SJ. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (citations omitted). A reviewing court is "obliged to construe the complaint in 
light most favorable to the plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor." 
Heiner v. SJ. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "The courts 
are a forum for settling controversies, and if there is any doubt about whether a claim 
should be dismissed for the lack of factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of 
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giving the party an opportunity to present it's proof." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 
795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted). 
DeBRY v. VALLEY MORTG. CO., 835 P.2d 1000 (Utah App. 
1992) lfA motion to dismiss is appropriate only where it clearly appears that 
the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under the facts 
alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to support their claim." 
Prows v. State, 822 P.2d. 764, 766, ( Utah 1991) (citing Colman v. Utah 
State Land Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)); see also, Olson v. Park-
Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991) ("Dismissal of a 
claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a severe measure given the liberality of notice 
pleading"). "Because the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of 
law, we give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a 
correctness standard." (some citations omitted) 
CANFIELD v. LAYTON CITY, 2005 UT 60 f 14 A plaintiff is required, under 
our liberal standard of notice pleading, to submit a "short and plain statement. . 
.showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and "a demand for judgment for 
the relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)-(2). The plaintiff must only give the 
defendant "fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a 
general indication of the type of litigation involved." Williams v. State Farm 
Ins, Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) (internal quotation omitted). 
On Appellee's motion to dismiss Appellee failed to clearly allege with some type 
of certainty that Appellant would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts as 
alleged in Appellant's Complaint, failing to make such a distinction renders Appellee's 
motion to dismiss moot. Also Appellee failed to factually allege how Appellant did not 
satisfy rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which states "A pleading which sets 
forth a claim for relief... shall contain (1) a short a plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which 
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he deems himself entitled." Appellee did not allege at all that Appellant did not satisfy 
rule 8, this type of failure also renders Appellee's motion to dismiss moot. 
Appellee does not go beyond the threadbare recital of rule 12 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure by stating that Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief would 
be granted, furthermore Appellee makes the following statement at the conclusion of the 
hearing by stating "I decline and deny him saying that I'm admitting any of the things 
that he's alleging in his complaint, when I did this motion to dismiss. That is not what I 
am doing at all in the motion to dismiss. I'm simply saying that I don't believe he has an 
action that would survive a trial, or a judgment by this court on that matter" [Id., 
transcript at page 27 ^[20-25] Appellee frankly admits that the purpose of Appellee's 
motion to dismiss was not to admit the facts as they are alleged in Appellant's Complaint, 
rather it was to declare a belief (which is non factual), that Appellant does not have an 
action that would survive a judgment by this court on that matter. After this statement 
the court then rendered a decision by stating ". . . I'm going to grant the motion to 
dismiss, and for the reasons argued by Ms. Lasker-Warden as it relates to claim made 
against Etitle." 
Appellee withdrew its motion to dismiss when it admitted that its purpose of the 
motion to dismiss was not to admit the facts that are alleged in Appellant's Complaint. 
By law, a motion to dismiss admits the facts as they are alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint 
and then challenges the Plaintiffs right to relief based upon those facts, being that was 
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not the purpose of Appellee's motion to dismiss, then by law the court erred by not 
denying Appellee's motion, nor should the court have recognized it as a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellant invoked and preserved the standard for obtaining a motion to dismiss in 
his brief and at trial court [Id., at transcript page 14, ^ [15-23, page 20, lfl[3-l 1], and the 
trial court recognized this standard. [Id., at transcript page 14, ^fi|24]. 
The court erred when it did not recognize by law that Appellee had withdrawn its 
motion to dismiss when Appellee declared that its motion to dismiss was not for the 
standard upon which it exists. 
The trial court erred when it did not adhere to the standard that controls a motion 
to dismiss. The court ignored the fact that Appellee did not challenge any of the facts 
alleged in Appellant's Complaint, and it ruled on Appellee's belief that Appellant failed 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
II. The trial court erred when it tried the merits of the case 
A motion to dismiss is not an opportunity for the trial court to decide the merits of 
the case. 
WILLIAMS v. BENCH, 2008 UT App 306193 P.3d 640 "A rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss addresses only the sufficiency of the 
pleadings, and therefore, "is not an opportunity for the trial court to 
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decide the merits of the case." Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, f 14, 
155 P 3d 893 
The trial court made a ruling on the merits of the case, more specifically during the 
course of argument the trial court decided that a certain instrument that was presented to 
the trial court titled "Adjustable Rate Note" is one and the same as an instrument titled a 
"Promissory Note". This decision ignored the fact that Appellant had factually alleged in 
the body of his complaint (as already stated above) that the Deed specifically defines 
"Note" to mean a promissory note and that Appellant was never given one, and that he 
requested one from the lender by letter but still was never given one, and for the purposes 
of a motion to dismiss this is (a) a fact that has been admitted as true, and (b) it is not an 
opportunity of the trial court to decide whether or not an Adjustable Rate Note is a 
Promissory Note. Furthermore during the hearing Appellant stated that he needed 
discovery to help prove that the Promissory Note is not the same as an Adjustable Rate 
Note and that they are two separate instruments and how there are other closing 
documents that have both. [Id, at transcript page 25 1HJ6-16] The trial court ignored this 
statement and the facts alleged in Appellant's Complaint, and then it listened to 
conclusory statements and belief of Appellee in order to make a decision granting 
Appellee's motion to dismiss. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it decided the merits relating to a 
promissory note vs. an adjustable rate rider. 
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The trial court erred as a matter of law when it did not construe the Complaint 
most favorable to Appellant when deciding factual disputes (Promissory Note vs. 
Adjustable Rate Note). 
III. The trial court erred when it became vague and ambiguous as to whether or 
not it converted Appellee's motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion 
The trial court declared that Appellee's motion to dismiss was moot for summary 
judgment [Id., at transcript page 25 ^fl], but then it also declared if attachments are made 
and a part of the record presented a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for 
summary judgment [Id, at transcript page 28 1fl[12-15]. One moment the motion for 
summary judgment is moot and the next it's been converted to a summary judgment. 
Which is it? 
The court erred by being ambiguous as to whether or not Appellee's motion to 
dismiss was converted to a motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, the trial court committed reversible error when (a) it did not 
recognize Appellee's withdrawal of its motion to dismiss, and when (b) it ignored the 
facts admitted as true in Appellant's Complaint, and when (c) it tried the merits of the 
case, and when (d) it did not favor Appellant over disputable facts, and when (e) its ruling 
was influenced by Appellee's belief and oral argument instead of facts. 
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Therefore Appellant moves this court to reverse the trail courts decision so that 
Appellant's complaint may continue. 
Dated this 25st day of January, 2010. 
Deron Branson 
Pro se and Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
T T T 
I hereby certify that on the 25 day of January, 2010 I caused to be mailed, via US Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the parties named below, a true an correct copy of OPENING 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND DEMAND FOR TRANSPARENCY 
Deanna Lasker Warden 
Lundberg & Associates 
3269 South Main Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Deron Brunson, Pro Se 
14 
ADDENDUM 
15 
Deron Branson 
138 East 12300 South #C 196 
Draper, UT 84020 
Telephone: 801-571-3199 
Fax: 801-545-9914 
ProSe 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
f/gykr ftr Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DERON BRUNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
ETITLE INSURANCE AGENCY, 
TRUSTEE, & JANE AND JOHN DOE 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
ETITLE INSURANCE AGENCY 
Trial Court No. 090401330 
Judge: Howard 
THIS CAUSE having come before this court on August 25,2009 at 1:30pm upon the 
motion to dismiss Etitle Insurance Agency by Defendant, and the court having heard argument of 
the parties and being fully advised in the premises, it is 
ORDERD AND ADUDICATED THAT 
Defendant's motion to dismiss Etitle Insurance Agency is granted. 
Done and ordered this ^-1 of September, 2009. 
/S/FRED P. HOWARD 
Honorable Fred D. Howard 
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